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CHARTER OF RIGHTS 
DAMAGES FOR NOT ALLOWING ARRESTED PERSON TO SEE HIS LAWYER 
Crossman v. The Queen - 12 c.c.c. (3d) 547 
Federal Court, Trial Division (Events occurred in Yukon Territory) 
The plaintiff had been arrested without warrant at 10:00 a.m., for 
assault (s. 245.3 c.c.). At 11:40 a.m. he had phoned his lawyer 
requesting him to attend at the Detachment building to give him legal 
advice. The lawyer then had spoken to the investigating officer and 
told him he'd be over in a few minutes to see the accused. Approxi-
mately 12 minutes later the lawyer had arrived at the police office 
only to be told he could not see his client until the officer had 
finished interviewing him. One hour later the officer had phoned the 
lawyer to say that his client was now available. The accused had not 
given any statement. He had entered a plea of guilty (was sentenced to 
3 months imprisonment) but now sought damages and costs for being 
denied his right to counsel (s. lO(b) Charter). He brought this 
action under s. 24(1) of the Charter as a remedy to the infringement 
of his rights. 
The circumstances are not unique. Similar situations have surfaced 
over the admissibility of statements, or, the evidence of a breath 
analysis. In this case no evidence had resulted from the infringement 
and the plaintiff apparently suffered no damages from the interview. 
Therefore, the damages he claimed were exemplary and punitive in 
nature. What the constable did amounted to a tort for which the Crown 
is liable. 
The Crown submitted that by consenting to the interview and not 
refusing to speak until his lawyer arrived, the plaintiff had actually 
waived his rights •. 
The Court was critical of the constable starting the interview before 
the lawyer's arrival, and thought it "inconceivable" that he had no 
access to his client until the interview was completed. That, said 
the Court "is in my view a clear infringement of the plaintiff's civil 
rights". Counsel is always entitled to speak on behalf of his client 
and "would certainly be justified in invoking on his behalf the right 
not to be questioned in the absence of his counsel". It could not be 
inferred from the telephone conversation between the lawyer and the 
officer, that the plaintiff had been advised not to allow the inter-
view until he (the lawyer) was present. However, the lawyer was most 
certainly entitled to see his client at the time he arrived at the 
station or sit in on the remainder of the interview. Furthermore the 
Court found that the accused had not waived his right to be questioned 
with his counsel present. 
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Once again emphasizing that this was not a matter of determining the 
admissibility of evidence, the Court found that the constable had 
committed a tort. 
Damages in the amount of $500 plus 
plaintiff's costs were awarded. 
Comment: The Court reminded the parties to the proceedings at least 
twice that it was not dealing with the admissibility of a statement 
had the plaintiff made one. The Court was dealing with an application 
for a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter and not with the 
exclusionary rule under subsection 2. 
Had the plaintiff given a statement in these circumstances, this Court 
would undoubtedly have found that his rights to counsel had been 
infringed. This would only have triggered consideration for exclu-
sion. The Court would have had to consider all circumstances and if 
admission of the evidence would have brought the administration of 
justice into disrepute. In other words, the statement would not 
necessarily have been inadmissible. 
* * * * * 
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THE CHARTER AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY 
Re Currie and Niagara Escarpment Commission 13 c.c.c. (3d) 35 Ontario 
High Court of Justice 
Mr. Currie was to be tried by an Ontario Justice of the Peace under 
the provincial Offences Act for allegedly violating some provincial 
regulatory law. Section ll(d) of the Charter which unlike the Bill of 
Rights applies to provincial legislation and administration, enshrines 
a right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal. Ontario 
Justices of the Peace who are appointed by and hold office at the 
pleasure of the provincial cabinet (executive) are not independent 
claimed Mr. Currie and he filed a motion for an order prohibiting any 
Justice of the Peace from presiding at his trial. The order was 
sought as a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter. 
The Court did a very interesting review of the history of the office 
of Justice of the Peace from the time of its inception in the 14th 
century. From Confederation until 1968 the office diminished in 
prestige and function. In 1968 the Ontario government abolished the 
office of magistrate and part of that office was assigned to the 
Justices of the Peace. In 1979 the Provincial Offences Act gave 
jurisdiction to Justices of the Peace to try nearly all provincial 
offences which carry a maximum penalty of $10,000. · This is 20 times 
that of the maximum fine for a federal summary conviction offence. 
When presiding at a trial the Ontario Justices of the Peace are, like 
any member of the judiciary, empowered to strike down legislation that 
is inconsistent with the Charter or outside the legislative jurisdic-
tion of the Ontario Government. 
The Ontario High Court of Justice reviewed the tenure and security of 
the Ontario Justice of the Peace. 
Appointments of Ontario Justices of the Peace are political in that 
they are exclusively done by means of Orders in Council. Although 
political patronage may play a part in the selection there is nothing 
unconstitutional or improper about such consideration. 
The appointment is for life, but the office is held at the pleasure of 
the Cabinet. In other words, any Justice of the Peace can be removed 
from office at political whim and without cause. He, therefore has no 
security of tenure and holds office at the pleasure of the prosecuting 
government. That is hardly independence, held the Court. 
Justices of the Peace are totally dependent on administrative direc-
tive what judicial duty they may perform. They are also evaluated by 
a provincial court judge who may adjust and expand the duties of a 
Justice of the Peace. This again is totally contrary to the prin-
ciples of independence. 
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There are classes of Justices of the Peace. Each has a different 
salary arrangement. Some are sitting Justices and others non-sitting, 
some are full-time, others part-time. The latter are paid by the hour 
or on a piece basis. Again, common sense causes one to conclude that 
the Justice is not independent from the executive branch of govern-
ment. 
The Ontario High Court of Justice therefore ordered that Justice of 
the Peace Allan and all other Justices of the Peace are not indepen-
dent and are prohibited from hearing the prosecution against the 
applicant. 
Comment: The Justices of the Peace in B. C. do have working arrange-
ments not unlike their counterparts in Ontario. In B. C. even provin-
cial court judges have, since the Charter, expressed that they are not 
independent and cannot seem to be impartial. 
To understand the importance of the Canadian Judiciary and the issues 
involved in these recent challenges regarding the independence of 
those appointed by the Provinces, perhaps the article I wrote in 
August of 1975 as a reaction to the then recently enacted B. c. 
Provincial Court Act may be of assistance: 
The Provincial Government, being responsible for the 
administration of justice, is in an unenviable predicament 
with its Court services. Many factors have created an 
apparent imbalance as proceedings are commenced at a rate 
greater than the Court can dispose of them. Preservation 
of proprieties renders Court time unpredictable; witness 
management with any accuracy is practically impossible; 
overloads cause fatal administrative errors; legal fancy 
footwork under the banner of justice, inhibit finalization 
of proceedings; particularly amendments to Federal 
Statutes have continuously added to this court's jurisdic-
tion; new laws and precedents have made it mandatory for 
the Court to conduct more trials on issues, "show cause" 
hearings, etc.: and an increase in regulatory laws have 
all added to the burdens of the Provincial Court. 
The Government has seen fit to attempt to remedy the con-
sequential problems and there has been greater involvement 
in the management of this Court over the last years. An 
attempt to streamline the services to this Court is quite 
noticeable (Sheriff's Services, Crown Counsel, Court 
Adminis tr at ors, etc.) and the Bill 100/ 197 5 "The Provin-
cial Court Act". This Act contains provisions which 
affect the Judiciary of the Provincial Court. 
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Laws that affect the Judiciary are sensitive under our 
Federal and "Anglo-American" system, particularly where 
those laws tend to bring the Judiciary under government 
control. The separation of the Judiciary from government 
is considered to be part of the principle known as "the 
separation of powers". Too much power in any one institu-
tion is a corruptive influence which does not insure for a 
good and just government. 
Executive Power 
The Cabinet consists of elected representatives, selected 
by the leader of the political party which has gained the 
most seats in the House. Needless to say that they are 
selected from those who gained seats for that party, 
unless the party is in such minority that it is forced 
into coalition. The cabinet exercises executive power. 
Reading our Constitution one is not left with the impres-
sion that the executive is all that powerful. They are 
only the privy council to the Crown. The Crown can 
disapprove legislation which the executive initiated and 
which was passed in the House. In other words, the execu-
tive when it "suggests" law seems to have to pass two 
hurdles: the House and the Crown. In reality, and especi-
ally when the party in power has the majority of seats in 
the House, there are no hurdles. For a cabinet minister, 
or for a government back-bencher to vote against his own 
executive is a cardinal political sin which can be very 
harmful to the individual's political career in Canada. 
Voting in the House is very much party controlled, except 
where the issue is one of morality or conscience. There 
are some pretty good reasons for this, but they are 
irrelevant to the issue involved in this article. 
For the Crown to ref use legislation is extremely remote if 
not unheard of. The executive itself does by convention 
enjoy invaluable privileges. Cabinet meetings are held 
in-camera; orders in Council can result which become law 
with only the approval of the Crown; for a minister to 
speak out against policy of the cabinet may well be the 
end of his or her political career; it controls the 
finances, and makes the appointments to official positions 
in government. In fact, the Cabinet is the government. 
As you can see, executive power is awesome and immense, to 
say the least. 
Judicial Power 
The Judges of all our Canadian Courts are appointed by 
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either a Provincial or the Federal Cabinet. The County 
Court Judges and up are appointed by the Federal Cabinet 
and the Provincial Court Judges by the Provincial Cabin-
et. No one denies that these appointments are often 
political. Nevertheless this has had very little effect 
on judicial excellence. The Liberals, when in power, may 
appoint a good Liberal to the bench, but he must be a 
qualified person. Each party seems to have a choice of 
numerous excellent people to fulfill the responsible task 
on the benches of our Courts. In Federal Canada this is 
indeed a responsible task, more so than in a unitary form 
of government. In addition to being the interpretors of 
the statutes, our Judges are in reality the referees 
between the levels of government or between the public and 
the government. Our Judges, at all levels, when having 
jurisdiction, may declare law initiated by that mighty 
executive ultra vires that government, or inoperable 
because it violates fundamental rights and freedoms. In 
other words, the Courts are the "check and balance" system 
by being watchdogs over legislative trespass either by one 
government onto the terrain of the other or by any govern-
ment onto individual rights and freedoms. An independent 
Judiciary is therefore one of the essential principles of 
our form of government. R. M. Dawson, a noted Canadian 
political scientist said: 
"The Judge must be placed in a position where 
he has nothing to lose by doing what is right, 
and little to gain by doing what is wrong, and 
there is, therefore, every reason to hope that 
his best efforts will be devoted to the con-
scientious performance of his duty." 
The Separation 
In view of the unique role of the Judiciary in Canada the 
need for a separation is obvious. Judicial review is 
really the only hurdle the executive has. This, by tradi-
tion and of necessity, dictates impartiality in private 
disputes and disputes between the individual and the 
government. Although it would seem desirable for an over-
zealous government to control judicial power, the indepen-
dence of the Judiciary has been preserved and observed by 
our governments. The Constitution does place the Judici-
ary of the Superior Courts (Provincial Supreme Courts 
Provincial Courts of Appeal, Federal Court and Supreme 
Court of Canada) out of reach of the governments. It 
states that they shall hold office during "good 
behaviour". This means that only criminal and corrupt 
behaviour would affect their tenure and can be removed for 
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such behaviour by "the Governor General on address by the 
Senate and the House of Commons". Note that it does not 
say "the Governor in Council". This means that the Feder-
al executive can only remove a Superior Court Judge by the 
request of both Houses. In addition, their salaries are 
established by Statute and not by cabinet. This, of 
course, so the livelihood of the Judiciary is not in the 
hands of the executive and to ensure that they be paid the 
same to avoid political gratitude. Another safeguard is 
the general but eroding policy that the executive does not 
promote Judges to a higher Court. This also may smell of 
political favour and gratitude. However, exceptions are 
made for the sake of excellence. It seems in recent his-
tory quite acceptable for Judges to be promoted to the 
more superior Courts. 
The County Court Judges are appointed by the Federal Cabi-
net and can be removed by them. The separation from the 
executive lies, by accident or design, in the jurisdic-
tion. The County Court is a trial court, and is under 
Provincial jurisdiction while the welfare and livelihood 
of its Judiciary lies with the Federal executive. 
It seems a correct observation that if government can 
create laws with controls to make bad Judges good, that 
law is equally capable to make good Judges bad. There-
fore, involvement of governments in managing the Judges is 
incredibly sensitive. 
British Columbia Provincial Court 
The Provincial Court Act institutes a Judicial Council 
which is to separate the Provincial government from the 
Judiciary of the Provincial Court. The Council consists 
of the Chief Judge of the Provincial Court, the Associate 
Chief Judge, the treasurer of the B. C. Law Society, the 
Chairman of the B. c. Bar Association, one Justice of the 
Peace, and three persons appointed by the Provincial cabi-
net. This gives the council eight members, four of which 
will be members by virtue of their office. Of the four 
ex-officio members, two are appointed to their office by 
the cabinet. The Council, therefore, consists of two 
members indirectly appointed by cabinet, four directly 
appointed, and only two over which the cabinet has no 
control. This council under the chairmanship of the Chief 
Judge has the statutory mandate to improve the quality of 
the judicial services in the Provincial Court. It must 
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propose prospective appointees to the bench; conduct 
inquiries respecting the Judges or Justices of the Peace; 
propose improvements in Judicial services; organize the 
training and conventions; prepare and revise a code of 
ethics; and report to the executive anything it (the 
executive) may deem necessary. Judges can be removed the 
same way they are appointed. Though they hold office 
while of good behaviour, the Act lists a number of other 
reasons for removal. Their salary is fixed by the 
Attorney General, their jurisdiction is for the Province 
and there are no provisions for a Judge to serve in a 
specific district. This could mean that their welfare, 
livelihood and place of employment is, in essence, in the 
hands of the Council and the Executive. Yet we cannot 
afford a Judicial Siberia for those who the public depend 
on to stand between them and the government. If there is 
a dispute, the referee cannot be an employee of one of the 
parties to the proceedings. If a dispute is between the 
Federal and the provincial government, the mediator ought 
not to feel that he or she must be loyal to the employer. 
The Act gives the Judges an appeal to the Provincial court 
of Appeal but only for removal from office. They could be 
as vulnerable as other government officials. 
Rebuttal: 
There are rebuttals to these submissions. Some can be 
found by comparing the provisions of the Provincial Court 
Act with those applying to other Courts or by comparison 
with Courts under other Federal systems. One could say 
that the Judges of the Supreme Court of Canada are totally 
at mercy of the Federal cabinet. The Act under which the 
Court operates is not entrenched. It can, therefore, be 
repealed by a simple majority in the House and Senate and 
all nine Judges would be removed en bloc. The same could 
be said in relation to the Federal Court. In West 
Germany, which is also a Federation, the Judges of the 
Courts are all government employees who, in addition, 
enjoy a promotional system. One could argue that whenever 
a Provincial Court Judge makes a decision on a constitu-
tional issue, it will, in all likelihood, be appealed; or 
decisions of Provincial Court Judges are not binding on 
other Courts. One could demonstrate, that for a democracy 
our Canadian Courts are too powerful and that they in fact 
legislate by interpreting the Constitution and thereby 
affect the supremacy of Parliament and obstruct govern-
ment. Democracy means people's power, and we must be 
governed by elected representatives who are responsible to 
the people but not by appointed Judges. 
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Reality: 
To suggest that the Parliament of Canada may repeal the 
Supreme Court Act is, of course, absurd. The same applies 
to the Federal Court which has unique jurisdictions, dis-
tinct from Courts in the provinces. 
To compare the Canadian Federation with that of West 
Germany can be misleading as it is different in concept 
and character. Firstly, the Judiciary - the same as in 
many unitary systems - only interpret the law and have, 
with the exception of one court, no power to judicially 
review the constitutional propriety of legislation. 
Furthermore, the German Provinces (Laender) have little 
original authority and do in practice depend on delegation 
of power by the senior government. There is, therefore, 
no "referee" role and little reason why the Judges should 
not be government officials. As to the argument that 
Provincial Court decisions on constitutional issues will 
be appealed and do not set a binding precedent, is of 
course without value. The Canadian "horizontal" Court 
system gives our lower Courts, when having jurisdiction, 
as much authority to deal with constitutional issues as 
the Courts of Superior Jurisdiction. The parties to pro-
ceedings before a Provincial Court are therefore entitled 
to judicial excellence and should not have to depend on an 
appeal for that. The Judiciary of this Court must as a 
consequence be as independent as their counterpart in the 
Superior Courts. To say that our Courts are by interpret-
ing the law interfering with Parliament is incorrect. The 
interpretation will only be of significance or binding 
while the law stands as it was when interpreted. Parlia-
ment may amend the law if the court's interpretation does 
not reflect Parliament's intent. As far as the constitu-
tional issues are concerned, the Courts cannot be super-
seded unless there is a constitutional change which could 
be a long drawn-out process. Our system, however, cannot 
permit the makers of the law to be its interpreters, to 
determine the constitutional propriety of legislation or 
to have control over those who are responsible for this. 
Then, finally, there is the defence that all Courts have a 
Chief Justice or Judge. This is true, but there seems a 
distinction between their role and that of the Chi~f Judge 
of the Provincial Court. The others administer the Court 
and assign sessions and workloads. The Chief Judge of the 
Provincial Court seems the liaison between the Judiciary 
and the Cabinet and, as Chairman of the Council, a sort of 
disciplinarian. 
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Summary 
It seems that if the Provincial Court Judges were treated 
similarly to the Federally appointed Judges, there would 
be no question about their independence. The Provincial 
Court Act could, from this constitutional point of view, 
be amended to ensure independence. For instance: 
1. The members of the judicial council could each year select 
from their own number a chairman with the Chief Judge and 
Associate Chief Judge as consultants to this Council to 
represent the Judiciary, and, be present at all its 
meetings. The liaison between this council and the 
executive should be by means of that chairman only. 
2. It could be provided that removal of a Judge should only 
be possible by "the Lieutenant Governor on address by the 
Legislative Assembly". 
3. The salary of the Provincial Court Judges could be set by 
statute. 
4. Perhaps a Judge should not be transferred unless it is upon his 
request or when there is no longer a judicial function to be 
performed where he is." 
* * * * * 
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RELIGIOUS PRIVILEGE - PRIEST AND PENITENT 
JURISDICTION TO ISSUE SEARCH WARRANT FOR A CHURCH 
Re Church of Scientology and The Queen - 13 c.c.c. (3d) 97 
Ontario High Court of Justice 
The Church allegedly sold items which according to their pamphlets, 
were to give their owner all kinds of religious and health benefits. 
These items (one of them a "crude" galvanometer) were sold for costly 
prices while the benefits to be derived were scientifically 
impossible; nor was the quality as representeda By this the Church 
allegedly defrauded the purchasers. 
Police obtained a search warrant for the Church and seized the 
stock of the items and related documents. The Church applied to the 
High Court of Justice to have the search warrant quashed and the goods 
returned, claiming that on the grounds of religious privilege there is 
no jurisdiction to issue a search warrant for a church and that the 
docwnents seized come under the Priest-Penitent privilege. 
The Court conceded that, preaching of a religion is no business of the 
State, but held that religious practices may conflict with the law. 
Rendering to God that which belongs to God and to Ceasar that which 
belongs to Ceasar, a church cannot practice religion contrary to law 
with impunity. The seized artifacts were, therefore, legitimate 
exhibits to prove the charge of fraud. Furthermore, there is no known 
privilege that interferes with the Judiciary's jurisdiction to issue a 
warrant to search a church. 
In regards to the Priest-Penitent issue the Court held that at common 
law or through the Charter, there exists no such privilege in Canada. 
The preferential treatment the clergy sometimes receive in the Courts 
is no more than courtesy, completely in the province of a trial 
judge. The practice has resulted in pressing counsel not to pursue 
questions that would compel a member of the cloth to breach a confi-
dence. Sometimes Judges have declined to compel a minister or priest 
to answer a question where he has claimed the non existing privilege. 
In general, it is no more than respecting religious confidentiality. 
.. 
Application to quash warrant and have arti-
facts returned was dismissed • 
* * * * * 
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE BY A PERSON OTHER THAN A PEACE OFFICER 
APPLICATION OF CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
R. v. Locke, 13 c.c.c. (3d) 515 
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench 
The accused was asked to leave a tavern as he could not prove his 
age. He complied. A short time later he was back again. This time 
he was requested to accompany a couple of tavern employees to the 
manager's office. He again complied and when asked to do so, emptied 
his pockets. After this, one of the employees, without asking con-
sent, went through the accused's pockets and found a quantity of mari-
huana. Police were called and a charge of possession was preferred. 
The trial judge acquitted the accused. He held that the accused's 
right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure had been 
infringed. It was by means of this very infringement that the mari-
huana was discovered and, consequently, the find was inadmissible in 
evidence. 
Section 32 of the Charter states that it applies to the Parliament and 
Government of Canada and the legislature of each government of the 
provinces. This means, it was urged, that in this case, where persons 
who were not government agents or law enforcement officers had 
obtained the evidence, the Charter did not apply. Furthermore, that 
should the Charter apply there was no infringement under section 8 and 
if the Court found that there was, it did not call for the exclusion 
of the evidence under s. 24( 2). These were the points the Crown 
raised when they appealed the accused's acquittal. 
An examination of U.S. cases on this point (whether the Charter also 
applies to the actions of a private citizen) was not very helpful. 
The wording of the U. S. Charter is quite different on this point. It 
simply enshrines that no State shall make or enforce law that 
infringes the rights recognized by the Charter. In other words, 
through the U. s. Charter "the American Constitution protects the 
rights of citizens against government interference whereas the 
Canadian Constitution protects the rights of citizens against any 
interference, be it government or private"*· 
The Court reasoned that if it was intended to exclude the Charter in 
matters between citizens, section 32 would have read: "This Charter 
only applies ..... instead of "This Charter applies". 
* Re Edmonton Journal and Attorney General of Alberta et. al. (1983) 4 
c.c.c. (3) 59. 
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The Court turned to a research article entitled "The Charter of Rights 
and the Private Sector"*. It is pointed out in this article that 
although one may be tempted to infer from s. 32(1) of the Charter that 
its provisions only apply to governmental activities it obviously is 
meant to cover activities in the private sector as well. Legislation 
applies to everyone within the geographical jurisdiction of the enac-
ting legislature, except to the Crown (see section 14 of the Interpre-
tation Act). It is a long established principle that the Crown is not 
bound by the law unless explicitly included. Section 32 of the 
Charter is precisely for that purpose. In other words if it was not 
for section 32 of the Charter, its provisions would only apply to the 
private sector and exclude the Crown and its activities. 
Section· 32 was also enacted to ensure its provisions applied to 
provincial legislative assemblies which was not the case with the Bill 
of Rights (1960). 
For these reasons one civilian can infringe the rights of another 
civilian and in this case the personnel of the tavern did violate the 
right of the accused to be protected against unreasonable search and 
seizure. The Court further found that this infringement was not a 
"mere gossamer possibility of prejudice against him" in the eyes of a 
fair minded community at large. Therefore, admission of the evidence 
obtained thereby would bring the administration of justice into disre-
pute. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Acquittal upheld. 
* * * * * 
* U. of Manitoba, 12 Man. L.J. p. 213 (1982) Professor Dale Gibson. 
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THE CHARTER AND PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERIES 
"IS THE CROWN OBLIGED TO TELL ALL TO ASSIST 
ACCUSED IN PREPARING A DEFENCE"? 
Re Kristman and The Queen 13 c.c.c. (3d) 522. 
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench 
Mr. Kristman was apparently driving dangerously and was apprehended 
with the assistance of a police dog. The events resulted in charges 
of dangerous driving, impaired driving and refusing to provide samples 
of breath. The Crown proceeded by way of summary conviction and a 
trial date was set. 
Mr. Kris tman' s counsel wrote the Chief of Police and asked for the 
names of the officers involved in this matter and an opportunity to 
interview all of them. The Chief responded that he could not comply 
and referred counsel to the Attorney General's Department. This 
prompted defence counsel to write the prosecutor with the same 
demands. He added notice that non compliance would be viewed as 
prejudicing Mr. Kristman in preparing a full defence. This, counsel 
wrote, would result in a request for adjournment and an application 
for a judicial stay of proceedings. 
Crown Counsel responded by pointing out that particulars and informa-
tion to the practising bar is provided by his office and "If you have 
not as yet obtained such particulars, feel free to do so". 
Defence counsel, apparently not to be deterred from his plan to have 
an examination of discovery by interviewing all police witnesses 
before trial, demanded, in answer to Crown Counsel's letter, to 
receive a copy of the policy that police officers are not to be made 
available for such purpose. In addition he promised to serve "Notice 
to Attend" on the police compelling them to appear in Judge's chambers 
to give evidence regarding the policy. He claimed that the particu-
lars available through Crown Counsel's office were already in his 
possession and now demanded particulars about all communications 
regarding the officers involved not wishing to be interviewed by him. 
The prosecutor's response to this demand was: 
"If they (the officers) choose not to submit to interviews 
by you they have no obligation to explain their decision 
to you." 
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Defence counsel then made application to the Court of Queen's Bench 
for a remedy under section 24 of the Charter, to the denial of his 
client's rights "to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according 
to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal" (s. 11 of the Charter). He requested that the Court order 
the criminal proceedings against his client be stayed unless within 
two weeks the Crown satisfied the Court of the Queen's Bench that: 
1. all names of the officers involved in the investigation are 
revealed; 
2. the Crown advises the police department to rescind its policy 
that no officers make themselves available for interviews with 
defence counsel as such policy is unethical, illegal and obstruct 
a person from receiving a fair trial; ~ 
3. that if the police officers, on their own initiative, still 
refused to be interviewed by defence counsel, Crown Counsel 
conducts the interviews of the officers and provide all details 
to defence counsel. 
In support of the application, defence counsel lamented how police and 
the prosecutor are in possession of all information and decide whether 
or not to prosecute. They also decide what aspects of the case are to 
be investigated and to what extent, while more in-depth investigation 
may well shed a different light on matters. Not having that 
information an accused person is disadvantaged and cannot prepare his 
defence and ensure that there will be a true verdict. He claimed that 
s. 11 of the Charter cries out for a full discovery policy and concept 
as had been suggested already in 1974, some 8 years prior to the 
Charter becoming part of an entrenched Canadian constitution. 
Furthermore the Canadian Bar Association's "Code of Professional 
Conduct" states that defence counsel may properly seek information 
from any potential witness and has a duty to interview witnesses. 
' It was submitted that at preliminary hearings, for instance, the 
prosecutor may call just enough witnesses to make a prima facie case 
against the accused, leaving defence counsel to discover through 
cross-examination who the other witnesses are. At least the defence 
does then have an opportunity to interview these witnesses and 
subpoena them where this is astute to do so. 
In cases where there is no preliminary hearing the accused person must 
have similar opportunity to discover the case against him, argued Mr. 
Kristman' s defence counsel. In this case Crown Counsel and police 
breached their duties in regard to the principles of criminal justice 
and had interfered with the accused's constitutional rights, he 
claimed. 
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A couple of interesting cases were brought to the attention of the 
Court. One* was where the Crown concluded its case while there were 
more witnesses listed on the back of the indictment. Defence counsel, 
when he objected, was invited to call those witnesses himself. He 
declined to do so on the premise that a defence counsel ought never to 
call a witness unless he first determines what evidence the witness 
will give. Said the Ontario Court of Appeal: "You are at liberty to 
communicate with them and find that out ••• ". "The counsel for the 
defence may not attempt to influence the story that that witness may 
give ..... "The mere fact that he interviews a witness in preparation 
of his defence has no effect upon the Crown". The Supreme Court of 
Canada held** after noting that the accused did not request inf orma-
tion in possession of the Crown but had demanded evidence for the 
purpose of his defence: 
"In my opinion, the failure of the Crown to provide 
evidence to an accused person does not deprive the accused 
of a fair trial unless, by law, it is required to do so". 
In this Kristman case the accused did not ask for evidence for his 
defence but requested information in possession of the Crown. 
Summing up the applicant's position that he has a rightt to interview 
witnesses or have access by alternative ways to their evidence, the 
Crown said that the Court was asked to depart from· procedures esta-
blished by a long line of cases and establish a new practice. This 
would include removing historical discretion from the Crown and compel 
it to assist defence counsel in providing lists of witnesses, arrange 
for interviews, and should these witnesses decline to speak to defence 
counsel, provide details of their evidence. Police departments would 
have to establish systems by which officers would be taken away from 
their duties to be available to defence counsel for interviews. 
Crown Counsel concluded his submission by pointing out that the 
accused is not entitled to a remedy under s. 24 of the Charter unless 
there is an infringement of a freedom or a right. Not making police 
officers available to him to be interviewed for him to discover the 
Crown's case against him is not such an infringement. 
The Court observed that there is a legislative scheme for pre-trial 
disclosures, which includes provision for preliminary hearings. It 
held that it is incorrect by judicial law making, to go beyond what 
the Charter itself and the Criminal Code are silent on. Extravagance 
* R. v. Gibbons (1946) 86 c.c.c. 20. 
** Duke v. The Queen (1972) 7 c.c.c. (2d) 474. 
t A "Right" as opposed to a "Freedom" places an obligation on another 
person to respond, comply or perform. 
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either in one direction or the other, in relation to fundamental law, 
will only bring disrepute on the justice system the court observed. 
What had to be strived for is "timely disclosure" as mentioned in the 
"Canons of Legal Ethics". Said the Court: 
"'Timely disclosure' of the Crown's case and the formal 
examination for discovery of all persons who may peripher-
ally be involved or aware by hearsay or otherwise of facts 
relative to a charge are clearly different things". 
The position of defence counsel for the applicant is clear observed 
the court; he does not seek a simple interview with Crown witnesses, 
he demanded a total pre-trial discovery including all peripheral 
material including police reports. In respect to police reports the 
court said: 
"They are an accumulation of facts known to the officer, 
suppositions or inferences by him, references to what he 
was told, suspected or thought." 
Defence counsel asked for a fishing licence on the waters of this 
material without indicating what species he was out to catch, doing it 
by any means available. Witnesses would be without judicial guidance 
or legal counsel during this expedition; even without protection on 
fundamental points or matters that cannot be disclosed. 
Whether a person receives a fair trial (the accused claimed that with-
out the evidence he wanted in advance he could not have one) is very 
much up to the trial judge. If he feels an accused is disadvantaged 
by not possessing certain information he can adjourn the trial and 
order that the Crown divulges whatever is necessary. Many other 
aspects of the trial or rulings made can cause a trial not to be 
fair. When this happens, then an accused can object or take whatever 
action necessary to have that infringement of his right remedied. In 
this case the accused asked for reparation before the defect had 
occurred. By analogy, his application was in the category of preven-
tative maintenance. The symptoms the accused identified simply fell 
short of justifying the diagnosis that an unfair trial would result. 
Said the court: 
". • • nor am I able to conclude the s. ll(d) of the 
Charter, has such reach, so as to provide to the accused 
the right of pre-trial discovery because, evidence as yet 
unknown, may be uncovered, and may prove useful at trial 
to the defence. The Charter does not provide such dis-
covery". 
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Considering that: 
1. production of evidence before trial is a discretion of the Crown 
and production of evidence at trial is a discretion of the trial 
judge; 
2. the accused has no discretion in this area; 
3. the Crown is not to withhold evidence for an oblique motive and 
especially not because it would assist the accused; and 
4. complete pre-trial disclosure is not part of our law and, there-
fore, access to all evidence and witnesses is not a right of an 
accused person; 
there was no infringement of a right and consequently no entitlement 
to a remedy under subsection (1) of section 24 of the Charter. 
Application dismissed. 
* * * * * 
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USING CRIMINAL LAW TO COLLECT A DEBT 
ABUSE OF THE PROCESS OF THE COURT 
Regina v. Van Holland 13 c.c.c. (3d) 225 
County Court Judges' Criminal Court Ontario 
When the accused arrived for work on Monday morning his boss, the 
Branch Manager of a trust company, was waiting for him and guided him 
into the Boardroom. There an auditor told the accused how he had, 
over the weekend, gone over the books and discovered that the accused 
had misappropriated $80,000. The accused conceded that he was 
responsible and apologized. However, he refused to sign a confession 
claiming that the amount was only $65,000. When that was amended he 
declined to sign until he had spoken to his lawyer. The confession, 
prepared by the branch manager, included an undertaking to make 
restitution and a verbal promise was made that a signature on the 
dotted line would avoid police involvement. Upon this assurance the 
accused did not only sign the confession but also a demand note in 
favour of his employer. At the accused's trial, the branch manager 
denied the promise of no police involvement and testified that he had 
simply been anxious to obtain the confession before involving the 
police. 
The matter was reported to police who did not interview the accused 
for several weeks. During this time, pension funds, accounts and 
stocks were signed over to the trust company by the accused to apply 
these funds to his indebtedness. Three months after the theft was 
discovered, police arrested the accused without warrant on a charge of 
theft. This had "shocked" the accused in view of the payments he had 
made and the promise that there would be no police involvement. While 
out on bail he had lunch with the branch manager who promised that if 
the accused would make full payment in the next few days, he (the 
manager) would contact Head Office, in an attempt to have the charges 
dropped. Although the manager denied to have made such promise, the 
accused, immediately upon the meeting, arranged a mortgage on his home 
and paid the debt. He said he would not have done so if it was not 
for that promise. However, the day before he paid the debt, the 
manager had sworn the information, charging the accused with fraud. 
The Court believed the accused and found that the company had used the 
criminal process as a means to collect a debt. The criminal law was 
not designed for that purpose. Had the accused paid his debt a couple 
of days earlier the criminal allegations would not have been made. 
Therefore, proceeding with the trial would amount to abusing the 
process of the Court. 
Stay of proceedings ordered. 
* * * * * 
- 20 -
UNSCRAMBLING PAY T.V. 
THEFT OT TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES 
Regina v. Miller & Miller 12 C.C.C. (3d) 467 
Alberta Court of Appeal 
A municipal police officer noticed 
Millers' television installation. 
this length of coaxial cable and 
unfolded. 
a "turnable stub" attached to the 
The Millers were questioned about 
tin foil and the following story 
Mr. Miller, who has some expertise in telecommunications, attempted to 
clear up the "co-channel interference" he experienced on his cable 
T.V. reception. He attached the "turnable stub" and the impaired 
reception became clear. However, to the Millers' surprise they dis-
covered that this gadget gave them a windfall benefit. The pay T.V. 
channels, with a little bit of fine tuning, came in clear and crisp. 
They did not complain and enjoyed thereafter the entertainment that 
came their way free of charge. 
The Millers were charged with fraudulently obtaining telecommunication 
services and thereby committing theft contrary to section 287(1) c.c. 
They were acquitted and the Crown appealed on the grounds that the 
trial judge had accepted the explanation by the Millers while expert 
evidence made their story incapable of belief. According to the 
experts the problems the Millers claimed they had, could not be 
remedied by the contraption Mr. Miller fabricated. Furthermore 
Miller's claim that he was receiving the pay T.V. channels clearly in 
black and white, prior to the installation of the "turnable stub" was 
technically impossible. The stub was, according to the experts "an 
instrument of theft". However, the Court of Appeal was not enthusi-
astic about reassessing Miller's credibility. The trial judge had 
believed him and with that the Justices could not interfere. Secondly 
the Crown claimed that mere watching of a pay T. V. channel without 
paying for it amounts theft whether or not it is possible . that the 
reception was not intended. Should the Court find that the reception 
of the pay channel was a windfall situation and could not amount to 
theft, then it should consider the "second obtaining" of the services 
when they subsequently to the windfall continued to receive this bene-
fit without intending to pay for it. The Crown actually asked the 
Court to apply a theory similar to "theft by finding". Finding some-
thing is innocent, keeping it without letting it be known that it was 
found so the owner will not claim it amounts to theft. The Court 
declined to do so on account of the wording of the charge. The infor-
mation alleged that the accused "fraudulently obtained" the T. V. 
service. They had not so obtained the service if one was to believe 
Mr. Miller. 
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The Court held that if the T. V. company wanted to prevent unpaying 
spectators they simply had to build higher fences. If non paying 
viewers receive unscrambled signals through no connivance of their 
own, watching the program does not result in an offence under 
287(1)(b) c.c. 
Comment: 
Acquittal upheld. 
Appeal dismissed. 
The subsection under which the accused was charged also prohibits 
fraudulently "using telecommunication facilities". It makes one 
wonder if a pay T. V. channel is a "facility" and if watching it 
includes "use". However, the Crown selected to charge under that part 
of the subsection that prohibits the fraudulent obtaining of telecom-
munication services and was, in the circumstances, unsuccessful. 
* * * * * 
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POLICE DISCIPLINE REGULATIONS AND JURISDICTION 
Bowles et. al. vs. John Post and Attorney General, B. C. Supreme Court 
Victoria Registry No. 184354 January 1985 
A good time was had by all at a "platoon" social get-together at the 
home of a municipal constable who lived well outside the boundaries of 
the municipality he and the platoon members served. The host and two 
other platoon members got the "Rembrandt" urge and allegedly painted 
grafitti on a retaining wall. The symbols and words were apparently 
aimed at and incredibly offending to an elderly neighbour. When she 
inquired why she was targeted, the alleged response by the host was 
equally off ending. 
The provincial police were called and advised the lady of the 
procedure under the Discipline Code appended to the Police Act. This 
resulted in a complaint in writing along with pictures and details 
being forwarded to the chief constable, the Mayor and Attorney 
General. 
An attempt to resolve the complaint informally failed and the chief 
constable ordered an investigation. The procedures as outlined in 
section 39 of the Police Act and the Police Discipline Regulations 
were followed. The chief received the investigation report together 
with the statements by the witnesses and the three constables. He 
refrained f .rom familiarizing himself with the content of the state-
ments, in compliance with the spirit of section 12(1) of the Regula-
tions which states that the decision whether to proceed with prefer-
ring a charge must be based on the investigator's report and to 
prevent a claim of prejudice as he intended to preside over the hear-
ing himself. He personally served the necessary documents on the 
constables and presided over the hearing when the constables denied 
the charges of "acting disorderly thereby likely bringing discredit 
upon the reputation of their police force". 
The bargaining unit to which the constables belonged petitioned the 
Supreme Court to prohibit the chief constable from conducting and con-
tinuing the disciplinary hearing. Grounds they raised in support of 
the application were, in essence, as follows: 
1. The constables were off shift and therefore the Chief Constable 
had no jurisdiction over them; 
2. The constables were not within the geographical boundaries within 
which they are municipal constables and peace officers; 
3. There is an apparent bias when the presiding officer over the 
discipline hearing was the recipient of the investigation report 
and the person who decided if and what charges would be pre-
ferred; 
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4. The Police Act and particularly the Discipline Code dictate 
procedures that deprive the accused municipal constables of the 
principles of fundamental justice; and/or 
5. The procedure as outlined in section 39 of the Police Act was not 
adhered to. 
In respect to points 1 and 2 above the Court held that the Police Act 
or its Regulations do not restrict the chief constable's jurisdiction 
to municipal constables who are on shift or within the geographical 
boundaries of the municipality they serve. Whenever a municipal 
constable discredits the reputation of the force, then regardless 
where he is ("at Shawnigan Lake, Vancouver, or New York") the chief 
constable must have power to discipline and correct; this to maintain 
the effectiveness of the force and public respect. 
In regards to point 3 above, the Court pointed out how the chief 
constable, under the Discipline Code has the power to order an inves-
tigation, receive the resulting report, lay charges and preside over 
the disciplinary hearing. That does not create an apprehension of 
bias, as he cannot and must not personally investigate the complaint 
or prosecute the charges. Neither can the chief sit on the appeal of 
his decisions. With appeal procedures in place and the Chief's 
actions leading up to the hearing being merely mechanical and 
procedural (including his decision to lay charge), there is no inter~ 
ference with the fair and impartial hearing the constables are 
entitled to. Therefore the reasons in 4. above were rejected also. 
However, the Court held that the chief constable had made a procedural 
error. Section 39 sets out a four part procedure: 
1. The complaint must be lodged with the appropriate disciplinary 
authority; 
2. The disciplinary authority shall attempt to resolve the complaint 
informally; 
3. If that informal process fails, then the complainant may submit 
the complaint in writing to the disciplinary authority; and 
4. The disciplinary authority, receiving a written complaint under 
(3) shall cause the complaint to be investigated. 
As explained, the complaint was triggered by an elaborate and detailed 
letter from the complainant. Therefore, when step 2. failed it seemed 
superfluous and redundant to ask the complainant to write again. The 
author of the section has seemingly assumed complaints to be verbal in 
the first instance. In any event, the section is procedural and not 
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designed to protect anyone's interest or to prevent abuse. As a 
matter of fact should step 2. be successful and no written complaint 
follows, a disciplinary authority is not prevented from taking disci-
plinary action. Although the trend is that only departures from 
strict procedure which are protective in nature are fatal, the Supreme 
Court Justice considered this technical error sufficient to grant the 
order to prohibit the chief constable from continuing with the 
hearing. 
Comment: The outcome of this application in respect to the bias and 
jurisdictions was somewhat predictable. Although any person who is to 
perform a judicial role must be conscious of the appearance of 
justice, he can hardly be considered biased for performing the duties 
imposed by statute. From time to time the issue of bias has been 
raised in regard to magistrates or provincial court judges who may 
have entertained an information supporting the application for a 
search warrant, before whom the proceeds of the search were brought, 
who may have issued a warrant in the first instance, then presided 
over the first appearance of the accused, decided on the bail hearing, 
presided over the trial and subsequently did so in respect to a co-
accused. Whether the Judge was biased must be demonstrated in the way 
he conducted the trial. If the rules of evidence were adhered to, 
natural justice was appropriately applied and the facts found, and the 
verdict is supported by the evidence, then previous knowledge is of no 
consequence. We are inclined to equate the rules related to jury 
members to those applicable to persons presiding over trials. In 
respect to the jurisdiction the Court applied a theory similar to that 
in criminal law. Where the perpetrator committed the crime outside 
the geographical jurisdiction of the court by which he is tried but 
where the victim suffered the consequences of that crime within those 
geographical boundaries, the court has jurisdiction. Mail frauds and 
those committed by means of credit cards are good examples. The 
Courts have held that, unless the accused has been convicted elsewhere 
for those very criminal acts, he can be tried in any of the jurisdic-
tions where the victim suffered the consequences of the crime. The 
Police Act and its Discipline Code seem to similarly say if the 
behaviour of a municipal constable brings disrespect on the force he 
serves then, regardless when or where he does it, disciplinary 
proceedings can be preferred and concluded in the jurisdiction of the 
victimized force. 
The Justice made it quite clear to be of the opinion that a chief 
constable can, in these procedural circumstances, go ahead with a 
disciplinary hearing. The Court held that sections 38(l)(b) and 40(2) 
of the Police Act provide for this. 
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Although section 38 is somewhat obscure as to its meaning, it seems 
that it, as well as section 40 are referring to public inquiries. 
These cannot be conducted until the "investigation is complete" (see 
39(4)). This, according to section 54(2) of the Discipline Code Regu-
lations is not the case until the "presiding officer" has found that 
the alleged disciplinary action should be dismissed, or on the date 
punishment is imposed. The investigation is not complete when the 
investigators present their report to the disciplinary authority. It 
is with the greatest respect that I wonder if the Justice was aware of 
section 54 of the Regulations. The applicable portions of section 38 
and 40 appear to only provide that a sentence can be enforced despite 
the fact that the municipal constable or the complainant has requested 
a public inquiry. 
* * * * * 
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THE CHARTER AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS 
WHEN IS INFORMING OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMPLETE? 
Regina v. Michael Johnny, Supreme Court of B. c., Vancouver Registry 
CC841146, September 1984 
The accused, a 19 year old native person, had been arrested for mur-
der and was subsequently questioned by two police officers. These 
officers informed their prisoner of his rights to counsel four times 
and asked him if he understood what he had been told. The response 
had been: "You mean ••• do I have • • • I tell you story about what 
happened, then you tell lawyer"? He was then told that what he would 
say • • • "we could say in Court, yes.". When asked, "Do you want to 
call a lawyer", the answer was "No". The accused had then made a 
statement which the Crown adduced in evidence. 
The accused was, at the time, a pupil at the school for the deaf. His 
hearing is severely impaired, his vocabulary is like that of a 6 year 
old while his reading capability is at a grade 4 level. One of the 
officers, before questioning the accused, had phoned the principal of 
the school and learned that the accused knew sign language. The offi-
cer was given the name and phone number of an interpreter. However, 
the officers decided to proceed without the interpreter. 
Evidence during the voir dire showed that the accused did not know the 
meaning of the words - "duty" - "inform" - "right" - "retain" or 
"instruct". Despite the four times he had been told of his rights, 
the court was asked to find that the accused's right to be informed of 
his right to counsel had been infringed. It was also submitted that, 
considering the circumstances, admitting the statement in evidence 
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. 
The Justice found that due to the accused not knowing the meaning of 
the key words in the form read to him, he was not informed of his 
rights as it was intended under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Having established that there was an infringement of the accused's 
right to be informed of his right to counsel and levying some criti-
cism at the officers as they ought to have known the accused's disabi-
lities, the statement was not allowed in evidence as such would bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute. 
* * * * * 
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EXECUTION OF SEARCH WARRANT - STATEMENTS 
AND THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
Regina v. Capson, County Court of Vancouver No. CC840807, January 1985 
Police obtained a search warrant for the accused's home under the 
Narcotic Control Act. They showed the accused and the lady he lived 
with an unsigned copy of the warrant and confined the two in the 
kitchen area of their apartment. A bag containing 42 smaller bags 
with marihuana (378 grams in total) was found. When asked who owned 
the marihuana, the accused said "It's mine" or words to that effect. 
The accused was then placed under arrest and for the first time during 
this episode, told that he had right to counsel. A further search 
resulted in the finding of more marihuana and a pair of scales. 
The accused, the lady he lived with and her daughter (who had arrived 
during the search) testified during the voir dire to determine the 
admissibility of all this evidence. They told the court that the 
accused, upon being informed of his rights, had asked to phone a 
lawyer. The answer had been: "There's lots of time for that". 
Subsequent requests to phone a lawyer were ignored. When he was taken 
to the police car to be transported to the detachment, the lady 
offered to phone a lawyer for the accused. He accepted her offer. 
The officers denied that any such requests were made and that no such 
conversation took place. They also denied that the accused asked at 
the police off ice to be allowed to phone a lawyer before he gave them 
several statements. 
Defence counsel argued that all evidence should be excluded on the 
basis that the warrant was improperly obtained and was, therefore, 
invalid. Consequently the search was unreasonable under s. 8 of the 
Charter. Furthermore the copy of the warrant shown to the accused was 
unsigned. This argument was rejected. Firstly, the officers had not 
obtained the warrant by any improper means. If there was anything 
amiss with the warrant, it was of a technical nature. For the purpose 
of the search the warrant was valid and the officers acted in good 
faith. In other words they acted in "objectively reasonable reliance" 
on a warrant issued by an impartial Justice of the Peace. In 
addition, an invalid warrant does not necessarily mean that the search 
is unreasonable*. The fact that the copy of the warrant was unsigned 
did not taint the search either, and the search and seizure were held 
to be reasonable. 
* R. v. Heisler (1984) 11 c.c.c. (3) 475, Alberta Court of Appeal. 
R. v. Cameron, November 1984, B. C. Court of Appeal CA001541. 
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The defence also submitted that the evidence should be excluded on 
account of the infringement of the accused's right to be informed of 
his right to counsel when, before his arrest, he was detained in the 
kitchen of his home during the search. The Court, applying the famous 
Chromiac test* held that the restraint during the search was not the 
detention contemplated by the Charter. Said the Court: 
"In my opinion there was no obligation on the part of the 
police officers when they directed the accused to remain 
in the kitchen area to then deny him of his right to 
retain counsel". 
Then the defence argued that the accused was denied his right to 
counsel when he, according to his testimony and that of his witnesses, 
had been refused access to a phone. 
The Judge had been impressed by the accused and his two witnesses. 
The officers who at the preliminary hearing testified not to recollect 
any request from the accused, had at trial "vehemently and abruptly" 
denied that any such request was made. 
On the balance of probabilities, the Judge found that the accused's 
right to have access to counsel had been denied. He therefore found 
that all statements the accused made after his arrest, were inadmis-
sible. The marihuana and the accused's admission of ownership were 
admitted in evidence. 
* * * * * 
* See page 3 of Volume 1 of this publication. 
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THE LETTER OF THE LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 
ACCUSED FAILING TO APPEAR ON UNDERTAKING AND s. 738(3) C.C. 
Horvath and The Queen, County Court of Vancouver No. CC841904, 
December 1984 
Horvath was arrested for theft and assault. He had been released by a 
Justice of the Peace upon his undertaking to appear. He did appear, 
and a date for trial was set. On the date of trial the accused failed 
to appear and as his lawyer had received no instructions the matter 
was adjourned. The court warned that if the accused failed to show 
the Court would proceed ex parte. The accused did not instruct his 
lawyer, failed to show up for his trial and was convicted in his 
absence, of both counts. The accused now appealed the convictions. 
Section 738(3) C.C. empowers a summary conviction court to proceed in 
the absence of the accused if he has failed to appear for trial where 
he was served with an appearance notice or had been served with a 
summons. This does not include an undertaking argued the accused and 
therefore the trial judge had no jurisdiction to proceed in the 
accused's absence. 
The Court found it unexplainable why Parliament would limit ex parte 
proceedings for two means only by which a person is compelled to 
appear. An undertaking is no less personal in terms of notification 
than the serving of an appearance notice or summons. The Judge 
assumed it was a draftman' s oversight. Though Courts have inherit 
jurisdiction over its own process they cannot try a person in his 
absence unless the law specifically permits it. 
Convictions set aside. 
* * * * * 
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THE COURT AND "THE DEAL" BETWEEN POLICE AND THE ACCUSED 
Regina v. Wood, County Court of Vancouver Island, Victoria No. 32991, 
December 1984 
Police arrested the accused, an 18 year old youth, with a quantity of 
marihuana in his possession. He had it for the purpose of selling 
it. When charged accordingly, there was no problem in proving the 
requisite facts. However, the accused claimed that there was a deal 
made between him and the police that should he cooperate and identify 
his source, the charge would be simple possession only. Despite the 
fact that the youth identified his supplier, he was released on an 
appearance notice which noted a charge of possession for the purpose 
of trafficking. 
The police acknowledged that there was such a "deal" but had felt that 
they could, in view of the evidence, not take it upon themselves to 
reduce the charge. They had however, in an attempt to comply with the 
agreement, sought the favour of the prosecutor. This was apparently 
unsuccessful. Counsel for the defence sought similar consideration 
for his client as was given in undistinguishable cases*. 
Another part of the defence was an issue raised in respect to the 
Charter. The accused had been wrongly released. The offence stated 
on the appearance notice carried a maximum penalty of life imprison-
ment. An appearance notice can only be issued in the case of summary 
conviction offences and indictable offences over which a Provincial 
Court Judge has absolute jurisdiction (see s. 451 and s. 483 c.c.). 
If we give the most liberal interpretation to the curious section 454 
(1.1) c.c., the accused could not be released by police other than on 
a Promise To Appear or a Recognizance. 
In any event police discovered their error after they released the 
accused and remedied it by re-arresting him. When the original arrest 
was effected the accused was told of his right to counsel, upon the 
second arrest he was not. This the defence claimed was an infringe-
ment of his rights and should result in some kind of remedy under s. 
24 of the Charter. 
In regards to "the deal" the Court acknowledged that arrangements and 
plea bargaining are not unheard of but held that such matters as these 
must be left between the accused, his counsel and the Crown. However, 
* R. v. Smith 22 C.C.C. (2d) 268. 
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he concluded that the accused had been misled by police and was not 
dealt with fairly. He did as was asked of him and yet he ended up 
being charged with the offence of possession for the purpose of traf-
ficking. 
The Court also found the "re-arresting" of the accused heavy handed. 
The Judge suggested it would have been better to allow their error "to 
sift through the Court for remedy". They could have released him on a 
simple possession charge and made the accused aware that that may not 
be the charge he would be facing. "Deals" are a matter involving pub-
lic policy which lies exclusively with the Crown. That should have 
been made clear to the accused and that would also have justified the 
suggested release on simple possession. 
When re-arrested, the accused should have been informed of his right 
to counsel held the court. Particularly in view of the complications 
that were caused by the error and the action to remedy it, a lawyer 
could easily have arranged with Crown Counsel a release as suggested 
above. Instead the accused spent the night in jail. 
This infringement triggered access to a remedy under s. 24 of the 
Charter. Although the Court seemed to imply that without this consti-
tutional provision it had inherent jurisdiction to rectify injustices 
and unfairness. 
The reasons for judgment are not clear whether the Judge used section 
24 of the Charter or the "court's duty to protect the judicial 
process", but a stay of proceedings was ordered on the charge of 
possession for the purpose of trafficking and a conviction entered for 
the charge of simple possession. 
* * * * * 
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ACCEPTING A BRIBE WITH THE INTENT TO INTERFERE 
WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. ACCEPTING 
MONEY FOR BRINGING MONEY INTO A CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE. 
Regina v. Smalbrugge, County Court of Westminster, Chilliwack 28/29 
February 1984 
The accused, a food services officer at a correctional institute, did 
on two occasions, bring money into the gaol for an inmate. He was 
tried for that he did "corruptly with the intent to interfere with the 
administration of justice, accept money for bringing money into the 
institute" ••• contrary to the rules of the institute. 
The inmate, testifying for the Crown, said that the accused knew that 
the money had been given by persons on the outside, who believed that 
he would use it to take a hairdresser's course. The accused also knew 
that the money was for purchasing drugs and had agreed to bring the 
funds in as long as he would receive part of it in remuneration. The 
accused denied this in his testimony and said that he believed the 
inmate needed the money to pay the tuition fees for the course and 
that he had accepted some money for his services only after the inmate 
had insisted he did so. 
There was no doubt that the money was contraband for whatever purpose 
it was brought into the jail. The accused was fully aware of the 
rules and he was at all relevant times a peace officer. The defence, 
however, claimed that the rules prohibiting the money being brought 
in, was no more than an institutional administrative rule and was 
not included in "the administration of justice". The Crown took the 
position that the sentence the prisoner served was judicially imposed 
and that, therefore, the rules of the institution were part of the 
administrative structure that governs convicted offenders. This is 
clearly part of the responsibility under the constitutional provision 
that the government provides for the administration of justice. In 
other words, the course of justice continues until the penalty is 
satisfied. The Crown claimed that if the front end of the system 
belongs to the administration of justice* then so does the tail end. 
This~ as the Supreme Court of Canada has said regarding the adminis-
tration of Justice in s. 109, that it is "••• not restricted to what 
takes place after an information is laid but includes the taking of 
necessary steps to have the person who has committed an offence 
brought before the proper tribunal". 
* Supreme Court of Canada in Kalick v. The King (1920) 61 S.C.R. 1975. 
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The Court was not persuaded and held that the administration of 
justice, as used in s. 109 C.C. "does not include the punishment 
itself, unless in the infliction of that punishment there arises a 
violation either by the punished or by those executing the punish-
ment". In this case there was no interference with the administration 
of justice as was intended by s. 109 C.C. Parliament meant to provide 
punishment for those who subvert the process of justice. The accused, 
if he had brought drugs in the gaol he would have conunitted the crime 
of trafficking; if he had assisted in an escape he would have been 
charged with that specific offence. He violated a rule made by his 
employer and he was "rightly fired for it". Had he, if it was within 
the range of his authority, arranged for the accused's sentence to be 
altered from what was intended by the Court, then perhaps he would 
have interfered in the administration of justice. He did not have any 
control over such matters and the money given to him was therefore not 
a bribe. 
Accused acquitted. 
* * * * * 
Note: Section 109 C.C. (l)(v) deals with accepting a bribe with the 
intent to procure or facilitate the commission of an offence. The 
Court hinted that if the Crown could have proved that the accused knew 
the money was intended for the purchase of drugs, a conviction could 
have been possible had he been charged under that subsection. 
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BREACH OF PROBATION - BURDEN OF PROOF 
Doggett and The Queen - The County Court of Westminster No. X012920 
November 1984 
The accused, convicted of theft, was placed on probation. One of the 
conditions was a curfew until he was fully employed or attending 
school. He was found in apparent violation of the probation order and 
charged accordingly under the Criminal Code. The accused was convic-
ted and appealed. 
The accused had remained silent on the issue of his employment, when 
arrested and during his trial. He argued that the Crown had failed to 
prove that he was not employed. 
The Court would not accept the defence position and held that the 
trial judge had appropriately applied section 730 C.C. which provides 
that the burden of proving that "••• an exception, exemption, proviso, 
excuse or qualification prescribed by law operates in favour of the 
defendant, is on the defendant". The employment and school attendance 
was clearly an exception, exemption, etc. Failure on the part of the 
accused to show that he was employed or attended school at the time of 
the offence allowed the trial judge to assume that the accused was not 
engaged in either. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld. 
* * * * * 
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CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS 
To what extent are police obligated to co-operate with an accused to 
prepare a full answer and defence. 
Regina v. Longejan, County Court of Vancouver Island, No. 07986 
Duncan Registry, January 15, 1985 
The accused just could not believe that his blood-alcohol level was as 
high as the breathalyzer operator said it was (200 mlg). He asked to 
be shown the dial after each test, but was refused. He then asked 
that a third sample and a blood sample be taken. Police declined the 
offers and instead placed him in cells for approximately four hours 
before releasing him. 
Some of the details about the process followed by police are important 
to explain the innovative and interesting submissions advanced by 
defence counsel. The arresting officer had made the demand for breath 
samples of the accused followed by the "police warning" which is 
assumed to include the right to remain silent and the right to 
counsel. After the breath samples were analyzed the accused was, 
without him requesting access to counsel or a doctor to take a blood 
sample, placed in cell. Not at any time was he officially placed 
under arrest but was told he would be charged with impaired driving 
and "over 80 mlg". When questioned by defence counsel the officer who 
had processed the accused said that he had decided to detain the 
accused in cells because of his state of intoxication. Although he 
did not inform the accused of this, the custody was in essence because 
of the wording of section 43 of the Liquor Control and Licensing Act. 
The section prohibits an intoxicated person to be or remain in a 
public place. Defence counsel argued that not releasing the accused 
on account of his intoxication amounted to the detention being for 
intoxication in a public place. The accused was not arrested or 
informed of this, nor was he arrested for the drinking driving 
offences. 
The officer, on the other hand, seems to have wanted to convey to the 
Court that although he failed to officially place the accused under 
arrest, the detention was for the charges he informed the accused he 
would face in the Court. His reason for not releasing the accused, as 
he is compelled to do when the public interest has been satisfied, was 
that he would have permitted the accused to comm.it an offence under 
the B. c. Liquor laws, had he released him. 
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Defence counsel, however, submitted that his client: 
1. was arbitrarily detained contrary to section 9 of the Charter; 
and 
2. could not be penalized except in accordance with the principles 
of fundamental justice which includes to be afforded an opportun-
ity to prepare a full defence. 
The latter point was raised as a consequence of the refusal to let the 
accused see for himself what the readings were, the rejection of the 
demand for a third breath test, and not being afforded the opportunity 
to have a blood sample taken. These events had deprived the accused 
from obtaining evidence to the contrary to rebut the presumption in 
section 237 c.c. that the blood alcohol level at the time of analyses 
is equal to that at the time of driving. 
The Court found that the officer had improperly invoked the detention 
of the accused. Nevertheless, the detention was not arbitrary. The 
detention corroborated the officer's opinion that the accused was 
intoxicated which would justify the detention under s. 452 (1) (f) 
c.c. to prevent the continuation or the commission of another 
offence. The four hour detention, in the circumstances, was reason-
able. In relation to all the prerequisites to a legal detention the 
Court reminded how the accused was made aware of all his rights when 
"the demand" was made of him; furthermore, before being placed in 
cells he was informed of the charges that would be pref erred against 
him. 
In regard to the blood test, the Court held that there was no obliga-
tion on the police to provide for such a test. The accused should 
have arranged for that himself. Despite his detention, there was 
nothing standing in his way to make the arrangements. Quoted the 
Court*: 
"If it were established that the police, upon arresting 
someone suspected to having committed an offence, were 
advised that unless active steps were taken immediately to 
preserve evidence favourable to the accused such evidence 
would be lost, and they in bad faith did or failed to do 
something which caused that evidence to be lost, then the 
accused person might have good cause to raise the Consti-
tution Act 1982 ...... 
In other words had the accused been hindered by police to make the 
necessary arrangement for the blood test he wanted, his argument that 
the principles of fundamental justice had not been adhered to in his 
case would have been successful. Neither police nor the detention had 
hindered or prevented the accused from making his arrangements and his 
* Regina v. Strayer (1983) 5 CCC (3d) 573. 
37 -
argument therefore failed. 
In an Ontario case* the appellant had raised a similar argument that 
he was deprived of making a full answer to the charges against him in 
that police had refused to let him see the dial that indicated his 
blood-alcohol level. The Ontario Court had held that a suspect is 
"entitled" to see the dial to ensure what is written on the certifi-
cate coincides with what the dial indicates. However, the Court also 
held that where the accused's attitude raises reasonable risk of 
damage to or interference with the breathalyzer the suspect must 
justifiably forego that entitlement. In the Ontario case the suspect 
had been such that there was a reasonable apprehension that damage or 
interference would result. In this B. c. case the accused had been 
"polite and co-operative throughout." 
The B. C. County Court Judge reasoned that the Ontario case does not 
propose that every refusal to be shown the results of an analysis on a 
breathalyzer scale, is a denial to make full answer and defence. 
Cutting through a lot of reasoning on this point, the County Court 
Judge in essence said to the defence counsel that if he had prepared 
better for the argument he may well have succeeded. Although the 
transcript shows that the operator in his testimony admitted that the 
accused asked to be shown the dial, he was not asked why he had 
refused to comply with the request. Neither did defence counsel 
dispute the accuracy of the reading the operator announced at the time 
and subsequently certified. 
The police officer is not duty bound to comply with the request, but 
ought to if there is no reason to refuse. In this case neither the 
Crown nor the defence pursued the reason for the refusal. Therefore 
there was no evidence before the Court that the accused's entitlement 
to see for himself what the reading was, had been triggered. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Conviction for "over 80" 
mlg. upheld. 
Comment: Please note that the B. C. Judge did not reject his 
Ontario's counterpart's view in relation to the "entitlement" (which 
he could have done) but, in fact, accepted it. He ruled, however, 
that the onus to show the prerequisite condition of the "entitlement" 
are on the accused. I am not so sure other courts would be that 
generous. This particularly in view of recent reasoning by the 
Supreme Court of Canada that seems to favour that the Crown must show 
that there was no infringement of a right or freedom. Although that 
was in regard to a right not raised in this defence, it nevertheless 
may be the beginning of a trend. 
* * * * * 
* The Queen v. Douglas Thunder Bay District Court No. 12380/83. 
38 -
OBLIGATION TO IDENTIFY ONESELF 
Regina v. Johnson County Court of Kooteney, Ross land No. CC58-l 984 
January 1985 
Larry Johnson, the accused, told police his name was Bolivar Swatwater 
and was not believed. He, along with three buddies was seen smoking a 
marihuana cigarette. This was inferred by the way they held the 
cigarette, the fact that it was passed from one to the other and the 
strong smell of marihuana smoke. When the officers arrived at the 
scene, the butt was ground under foot. What was retrieved was inade-
quate for an analysis. The three buddies identified themselves but 
the accused was hostile and persisted that Swatwater was his name. In 
addition he gave an absurd birthdate and a non existing address. He 
was convicted of obstructing a peace officer in the lawful performance 
of his duty. 
The accused appealed his conviction arguing that he was, in the cir-
cumstances, not obligated to identify himself. Defence counsel 
reminded the Court that the Crown had to prove the officers were 
performing a lawful duty and that the alleged obstruction must have 
been wilful on the part of the accused; the latter meaning that it had 
to be intentional and without lawful excuse. 
The Court held that an offence had been and was seen to be committed. 
What they saw gave them reasonable grounds for so believing. This 
placed the officers under a duty to attempt to identify the offender 
so process could be commenced against him. This placed an obligation 
on the accused to identify himself. His failure to do so was there-
fore wilful and the circumstances support that it was intentional. 
The appeal was dismissed and 
Conviction for obstruction upheld. 
* * * * * 
